Energy requirements and nuclear power in Europe. European Community Information Service (Ottawa) Information Note, NR (78) 24, 12 June 1978 by unknown
European CommLlnity
European Community lnformation Service
35O Sparks Street, suite I I lO, Ottawa, Ontario KIR 7Sa
INFOR}.{ATION NOTE
ENERGY REQUIREMENTS AND NUCLEAR POWER IN EUROPE
1lams, Director-General for Energy,
prepared the following address for
the Canadian Nuclear Association in
******
1. The formatlon of energy policy in the European Conununity, as in most.
world, takes place against the background of an assumedother countries in the
r?energy crts istf .
It ls important to avoid misunderstandings about what. is meant by
thist Clearly energy supply now poses very few probl-ems; oil is abundant and
energy prices are relatively stable. But this apparently comfortable positlon
i.s deceptive; not only does the threat of political (and hence oil supply)
,lifficulties in the Middle East remain wlth us, but we also face a more serious
longer term situation. This is that unless !ile take strong anticipatory action
now, rapidly mounting pressure on limited world oil supplies will during the
middle of the 1980s begin to have a serious effect on oil prices in real Eerms.
Some figures illustrate this prognosis. Current world demand for OPEC oi1 is
about 3O mbd (mlllion barrels per day); by 19851 oo current trends, it could
exceed 40 mbd 
- 
an increase of over 3O per cent. Some statistics relating to
the world's largest oi1 exporter, Saudi Arabiar point to the same difficulty.
Saudi Arabia produces oil far in excess of the flnancial needs of its investment
prograrxme. They have already limited their productlon to 8.5 mbd. By 1985, the
importing countrles may be demanding Saudi production of up to 15 mbd. We cannot
be sure that Saudi Arabia wtll be able or willing to produce at that level.
2. I quote these figures for ll"lustrative purposes only. The lesson,
however, ls clear. Some argue that policy intervention now is unnecessary, in
that the laws of supply and demand will act on prices to bring about an automaEic
oi1 rati'oning, and to make economic other energy sources which are presently not
competitlve. UnfortunateLyr such an attitude of laisser-falre would only work
if large olt prlce increases could result in new production from new investments
in other sources inunediately. But the lead times in energy investment are very
long; it takes up to ten years to bring a nuclear reactor on stream from the
time of inltial decislon. Typtcal tead ttmes for deep-mlned coal in the U.K. are
5-8 years, those for a deep-water oilfield in the North Sea 4-6 years. Unless we
take action now, therefore, to reduce our oil demands and to diversify our energy
base, we shall find ourselves having to make very expenslve lnvestments in great
aste, and ln the meantime suffer severe economic and social hardship as a result
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3. A cardlnal princlple of the EC's approach to these problems of demand,
supply and investment is that they can be better solved throulh the maximumdegree of lnternational cooperatlon. Energy is a world 
""rorr"", 
internationallytraded, and vital to the interest,s of all countries. The nine member states ofthe EC base thelr approach to Conrnunity energy policy on the beLief that they can
achieve more through greater internal pollcy cohesion, and through a united stand
on external questlons, than they could if they went their separate ways. But we
see internatlonal cooperatlon and discussion growing on varilus 1eve1s. Theindustrialized countries have now come together ln in" rna (International EnergyAgency) where valuabte work is done, and in whlch the Conrnission of the EC
Participates. Bllatera1 contacts abound; the EC certalnLy places a high value onits biannual discussions with Canada in which energy plays- an important part. TheEC is engaged ln the Euro-Arab Dialoguer and in simllar talks with Iran, in
which oll questions play a prominent part. The CIEC (Conference on rnternationalEconomic cooperatlon,-rNorth-south Dial"oguer'), concluded last year, made a
valuable start to the energy debate involving producers, 
"orr"rrr"rs and the oilimporting developing countries; it remains to be seen how this initiative willbe followed up within the Unlted Nations. As the energy links between the EC
and the Soviet bloc become more important, and as the impact of the Soviet bloc,spossible future demands for oi1 imports is better appreciated, closer consultationwith those countrLes may well become necessary.
4' After this account of the international background, I now turn to theConrnunityts own situation. In cormnon with many western countries, prior to 1973the EC had enjoyed high economic growth based on cheap and abundani oil supplies.By 1973, we had become dangerously dependent on this Lne f,ue1, and we were i11-prepared to meet the challenge of the Arab oil embargo. That embargo showed howfundamental energy is to al-l aspects of economic and social activity. The effectsof the price increase are stiIl with us in the form of a prolonged economic r"."""ior,.
5' In response to the 1973-L974 oil crisiso the EC agreed ambitious resolutions









reduce the ECts dependence on energy imports and toproductlon from a1l sources.







brlng about a gradual transition from an oil-dominated energy economytowards a more broadly based supply pattern.





to reduce overall consumption by 15 per cent from the forecast made int973.
to increase coal consumption to 355 milLion tons, and community coalproduction to 3OO million tons.
to reduce the share of oil in total 
"o.,",rr,fntion from 61 per cent (1973)to 5O per cent. I 
'
to reduce the conrmunity's, dependence on enefgy imports frorn 63 per(1973) to 5O per cenr I
to install nuclear capacity of at least 16O Gwe.
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In additione the Conmunity agreed on a number of measures relating to
energy conservation, supporE for the coklng coal industry, limitations on the use
of oil and gas in power stations, loans for investment in nuclear power station
:onstruction, and to an extensive four-year R and D Programme, covering nuclear
research and new energy sources. These were compLementary to the various but
generally wide-ranging policies and measures introduced by the nirie member states.
7. The results so far have been mixed, and although the inunediate world
energy picture may seem reassuring 
- 
with no major supply or price problems 
- 
the
longer-term dangers of excess oil demand pressing heavily on prices remains. So
there is no room for complacency.
8. It seems likely that the Conununityrs target for a 15 per cent reduction
in consumption by 1985 will be more than achieved, and a 25 per cent reduction
from the 1973 forecast ts nolr thought possible. But this in large measure is due
to the prolonged economLc recessionr rather than to the measurable results of
energy conservation. The Community also looks 1ike1y to achieve its targets for
the share of oil and for dependence on imported energy. Both shares currently
stand at 54 per cent. The Conrnission has proposed a 5OO million ton oi1 import
limit for 1985, compatible with the overall IEA target for that ]€;rrr UK North
Sea oil plays an important part in this, but wil-I not contribute more than
20-25 per cent of Comrnunity demand.
9. On the other hand, the Communityrs coal targets will be difficult to
achieve. It is not proving easy to increase investment in extra coal-burning capacity.
The world coal market is relatively smaltr but imported coal enjoys a substantial
price advantage over Community coal, which is normally difficult and costly to
mine. Nevertheless, the Community has large-scale coal reserves which will form
rn lncreasingly valuable source of internal supply as price relativities change
in favour of coal; in the meantime the Commission is pressing hard for the adoption
of various coal support measures.
10. The orlginal target for installed nuclear capacity in 1985 (a minimum
of 160 GWe) will not be achieved. It is now likely that no more than 8O-9O GWe
will be in service by that date. This slippage is equivalent to about 100 mtoe(miLlion tons of oil equivatent), and is due to many factors: technical and
engineering difficulties, both with t,he reactors themselves and with the generating
plant; reduced demand forecasts, and hence deferment of investment decisions;
public opposition to the construction of nuclear power stationse and increasing
political debate on the subject; and, in some cases, lengthy planning enquiries.
11. The Conrnission of the EC has often been characterized as being obsessed
with the need to rrgo nuclearrr on a massive scale as fast as possible and without
regard to alternatives. Our true position is very simple and it is that we regard
the steady deveLopment of a nuclear elecEricity generating capacity as one of the
essential components to a balanced energy supply pattern to meet 1ikely future
needs. Although nuclear power has been a very important cornrnercial reality for
trf,ent,y years, present Community capacity of 23 GWe supplies only about 3 per cent
of the Communityrs total energy requirements, and abouE 1O per cent of our
electricity output. These are modest figures and do not indlcate a reckless
approach. However, looking towards 1990, taking even a fairly pessimistic view
about economic growth, and bearing in mind the obvious limitations on coal-burn,
Ehe availability of oil- and natural gas, and the contribution from new sources,
up to 12 nuclear units will have to be ordered each year between now and 1985
.f supply requirements are to be met. This in itself will be a major operational




The Cornmlssion ltself 1s not responsible for nuclear investment decisions,
and has no powers in this respect, although lt does grant loans for this purpose.
Nuclear programlnes are the responsiblltty of member states. But neither member A
states nor the nuctear lndustry can act ln a way dlvorced from publlc and interna- Itional opinion and obligations. Internally, Governments have a clear duty to
present the facts behtnd nuclear issues to their electorates as objectively as
possible, so that public debate may be based on information rather than emotion
or prejudice. The Commission of the EC took an initiattve in this direction when
last November and in January of this year a series of open dlscusslons took place
in Brussels on the future of nuclear power. A11 shades of opinlon rrere represented.
Another noteworthy exerclse in public examlnation into nuclear developments was
the prolonged enquiry lnto the proposed nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at
I,Iindscale in England. This process was lnrnensely palnstaking and the tenor of
the evidence was witness to the spirit of objective analysis which the parties
to both sides of the argument can display.
13. Externally, the advocates of nucLear power prograrlrnes have to satisfy
a wide range of internatlonal undertakings, whether on a bilateral or multilateral
basis. Many uranLum suppliers, includlng Canada and the USA, are lnsistent on the
observation of certain restrictions on the use of nuclear fuel. The Comrnunityr
in the Euratom Safeguards Control, has an established system of checking on the
use of nuclear fuel in all civtl establisharcnts, and is close to final agreement
on the basis of lts relationship to the Inspectorate of the IAEA (International
Atomlc Energy Agency). The Cosrnlssion ls partlcipating activel-y in the INFCE(International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation)r now well under way, and which the
Conununity hopes will produce constructive practical results whlch will do much
to solve the questions of nuclear safety and non-proliferation.
t4. The Cornmunltyts attitude towards nuclear power ls coloured by lts lack
of lndigenous energy sources, such as fossil fuels and uranium, in comparison
with, for example, the USA. Thls h'as several consequences:
(
11
fhe'Corrnunlty has a more urgent need to build up conventional nuclear
Polrer,
the Conrnunity needs to pay particuLar attention to the efficiency of
fuel use, and to the conservatlon of uranium, which is itself a finite
resource,
lt follows from (ii) that (a) the Conunisslon sees advantage ln the
fast breeder reactor, which could have a fuel-use efficiency of about
6O per cent compared wlth about 2 pet cent for most llght water reactors;
and (b) the Conrmission attaches importance Eo the reprocessing of irra-
diated fuel, as a means of fuel recovery and of reducing the waste
storage problem.
On the fast breeder reactor, the Corunission wants work to go ahead
111
15.
steadily, so that reactors of corrnerclal scale are available as an energy policy
option in the 1990s, if circumstances require and technical and safety progress
permit. Several experimental and protoEype fast reacEors have been in operatLon
in the Conununity for some years, and one of conrmercial size (12OO MW) is now
being but1t.
16. The Conrnission conslders that by the developmenE of a Community reproces-
sing and recycling strategy, the Corrnuntty could by 199O reduce its uranium requL-
rement by 2O per centr and its enrichment requirement by 15 per cent. These savings
are partlcularly slgniflcant when 8O per cent of our uranium supplies are imported.
. .ls
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Reprocessing wouLd be an essential element of a large-scale fast breeder reactor
programrnei and action in thls field by the Conrnunity could reduce the risk of
other states, not signatories of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), engaging
in reprocessing themselves. The Commission is proposing a high-leve1 study of
the possibility for joint ventures in the reprocessing field on a Conununity
basis. The aim would be to avoid duplication to bring about efficient co-operation
between fuel processors and users, to extend access to users in third countries,
and to enforce the highest non-prol-iferation standards.
t7. The Conrnission is also proposing an active Communlty progranme in the
field of nuclear waste handLing. The intention is, on the basis of detailed study
and the pooling of lnformation by member states, to establish a Corrnunity network
of sites suitable for the storage from aLl member statesr and to harmonize national
practices and regulations governing nuclear waste management.
